

Animal Autonomy E-Reader edition farangis



Edition Farangis: Animal Autonomy E-Reader

Jahrgang 5, Nr. 4

September 2024

ISSN 2700-693X

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Fragments in Antibiological Animal Sociology: From Speciesism to Animal Objectification

Decolonialism doesn't explain forms of nonhuman objectification

Decolonialism does not explain forms on nonhuman objectification and human “ruling via definition” in regards to “(nonhuman) animality” (which in itself is yet a term to be argued about and to be analyzed).

Decolonialism is one thing, Animal Objectification has its own histories, even when problematics converge and overlap, e.g. in terms of ecological, eco-social contextualities. Brining decolonialism in as the solution for forms of animal objectification puts all hope on intra-human cultural diversity and ignores the dilemma of human definition of animal identity, which is simply not considered to be a historical major mistake seen in itself.

Decolonialism applies to intra-human constellations while the schism between “animal” and “human”, as some form of great hierarchically applied identities, stands outside of intra-human conflicts.

The notion of “human“ and the notion of “animal” differs with individuals, differs in different times and in different cultures. Bringing us all together under the assumption of functionability can't solve the source of conflict between the predominant varied human notions of “human” and varied human notions of “nonhuman and animal” which resulted in today's settings that we persistently have with animal objectifications.

Also, the problem with decolonialism to be applied as a tool to dismantle animal objectification raises the question of why the histories of animal objectification can't be addressed with their own complicated specifics.

Subversion and Oppression

Who pretends that subversion functioned differently in society than oppressive patterns, with both relying on similar basic assumptions about the human-animal-nature schisms – mostly in regards to the phenomenons of “existential meaningfulness” and the question of “self-authority”?

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Critique of mainstream Animal Allies

Those most visible of today’s animal allies (the animal rights and animal liberation movement) are equally unwilling to abstract from the biologism they apply to their perspectives on animality in a seemingly unquestioned manner, not different to any perspectival view on animality expressed in the conventional foundations of “human” hybris.

They equally limit their view to the equation: human > reason/self-authority; animal > instinct/ application of any reductive definitional view. The paradigm-shifts in concepts of culture, languages, and sociability/socialness themselves haven’t taken place in human emancipation yet, to extend to nonhuman groups and individuals. Manifoldness and heterogeneity do not appear on the human map, outside of hierarchical hegemonic ideas of life and living beings in general.

Argumentation routinely lays a burden of proof in a comparability of nonhumans to humans, as if a.) some unique standard of measurement always had to be taken, and b.) as if “human” could be grasped as a single monolith, when in comparison to “nonhuman”.

Ethics and Rights, as always (dangerously narrowly understood in technocratic environmentalism)

If you conflate the facts of ecological human destructivity with the factuality and bare existence of animal bodies, by statistically and quantitatively adding up the array of damages caused by the existence of animal bodies in animal agriculture, then you make these animal bodies responsible for human actions of animal objectification.

Why don't you instead name the injustice that animal bodies live through and die under? Do you assume that ecological destruction has nothing to do with the violations of nonhuman spaces? At least you never seem to talk about the harsh facts of injustice towards nonhuman animals when you discuss the ethical fallacy of anthropocene destructivity.

Reminder: Ethical talk without (animal) rights isn't plausible.

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Alternatives for the term speciesism

PREAMBLE

We need a term that describes the broad discrimination/s or injustice/s exerted by human collectives and human individuals towards nonhumans animals and towards nonhumanity overall – in all its facets in which these oppressive mechanisms, thoughts and actions occur in different human cultural layers, such as religion, science, law, arts, etc.

Also, we need a term for the overall phenomenon of human destruction and destructivity in these regards. I refer to it as faunacide, as far as nonhuman animals are concerned. Some criticize the term “speciesism” on various grounds, I ask everyone to come up with more descriptive terms for what we witness and might conceive differently.

Alternative terms for speciesism

SPECIES-/ANIMAL-DEROGATION ; SPECIES-/ANIMAL-DEROGATIVE /-DEVALUATION /-HUMILIATION -...

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Animal portrayals in language 1

Why do speciesists and antispeciesist alike verbally make/cite basic similar descriptions when it comes to talking about Nonhuman activities, referring to instinctual behavior patterns more or less? Observationwise they both obviously fetch their language from the same biologicistic box. As if lived subjectivity, outside that of a “human” self, was non-describable. As if an idea of generic pictograms ruled our language about what in reality is the nonhuman autonomy missed by these portrayals per definition.

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Trauma 1 (on biologicistic approaches to trauma)

When nonhumans are forcibly subjected to trauma, it does produce trauma, but translates into a problematic that a biologicistic approach to nonhumans won't be able to unravel. Trauma occurs in context with all fine tunings of psyche and mind – can't ever be understood by violence.

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A Nonhuman can't be reduced to a symbol

Antibiologism in Antispe: Animal Symbolism vs Animal Mythologies.

A start to my argumentation:

Animals as symbols is a dangerous terrain to step on, since

1.) images are to be seen in contexts of concrete modes of usage and are never stand-alone, absolute “symbols”.

2.) When you have an epistemic background in which animals are mythological, they can never be reduced to symbols – or would you call deities or your god or your friend or ideals appearing anywhere to ever be just a “symbol”?

A symbol is a proxy for something else that it stands for. When it's used to refer to real existent individuals you ethically enter a slippery slope, you start reducing the world to pictograms. Reducing the receptive interpretations of animal representations to “animal symbolism” fails to see the intricate languages expressed about human/animal relationships e.g. in arts but also in the iconographies of daily speciesism.

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I wrote an English fragment on a difference between symbolism and mythology with this text:

A fragment on insect mythologies

A fragment on insect mythologies and insect representations, and why symbolism is not sufficient to explain the relation

Insects in mythology are mostly explained as a phenomenon that stands for a “symbolism”. It seems that authors/researchers find it hard to imagine that for instance the Scarabaeus (attributed in the Egyptian pantheon to the God Kheper), a “dung beetle”, was appreciated for more than just that, what humans attributed to him in terms of their own anthropocentric concept of the earth, its meaning and the universe.

What if for instance the early Egyptians did see a world of unique value in the life and activities of the scarab beetles?

It could likely be that it was fascinating to observe, how the beetles rolled this ball of soil and dung, to think about what meaning the beetles might have given to their existence on earth overall. Maybe it was that ancient civilizations/cultures had an ability to take nonhuman animals as cultures? A small beetle that rolls a ball like a planet, from which new insect life would spring forth

A typical thought you find on the topic of nonhuman animals and nature in mythologies is, that humans would imbue nature with meaning. Quite contrarily, people could have felt that nature did in fact have meaning, and that nature (being) is meaning in itself.

As far as I could find out now, the most prominent mythologies about insects and alike, evolve around: bees, butterflies, spiders, scorpions, cicadas and the scarab beetles.

If we add the heavy weight of underlying such a relationship in mythology to our today's definition of "symbolism" – that is if we say that i.e. such insects were mere symbols for anthropomorphic attributions – then we should scrutinize more closely the epistemological history of "symbols" and the term's etymology to shed light on the construct that we apply here.

I extended this draft in German here:

E-Reader: Gruppe Messel 2018 / 4. Jg. 1 (2018), Heft 4. ISSN 2700-6905, https://farangis.de/reader/e-reader_gruppe_messel_2018_4.pdf

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Animal cultures: relations

Animal cultures vs species. Relating to Nonhumans as Humans:

If you segregatively can't relate socially (including empathically) on all or any level with Nonhumans, you equally create spaces where humanity is condemned to be self-centric: subjectivity can relate and there are no borders in the good and bad.

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Animal cultures

The better option with our limited vocabulary is to speak about Animal cultures instead of Animal species. (Nothing new but needs to become practice.)

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Defend whom and how

Interesting when people defend humans from humans insistingly on the back of nonhumans. Refined speciesism.

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Animality and conceptual corners

Why treat nonhuman concerns in assigned fields, instead of debiologizing the typical stances on animality? “Being a human” is still taken as a sociological state, while “nonhuman behaviour” is routinely relegated into the categories of being biologically driven/dominated.

- Animality can be seen in debiologized ways.
- Embracing existential plurality means wider perspectives than anthropocentrism are required

We can mutually learn as social and ecological beings.

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Speciesism/Animal Objectification and deprivation (1)

Nonhumans are constantly put into a Kaspar Hauser-like situation, where it is assumed that imprisonment and deprival from > social bonds and contexts experienced in relative freedom > creates a justification for further and deeper going discriminatory means, until finally the affected is free to any abuse by anyone of the ruling human collective.

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No shared positions on animal and human ethics

If a high in human ethics is inseparably accompanied by factual animal degradation coming in any form, then such ethics are questionable and can't be left uncriticized because of the imperative of “humanness”.

...

Human ethics are questionable in how they function within. To use the notion of “humanness” to legitimate objectifications of animal bodies is part of the prolongment of inner human injustice equally as it is injustice towards nonhumans. The forced, expected exclusive solidarity with “the human” separates the logics of socio-ethical communities from one another.

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Antispeciesist/Anti-Animal-Objective plurality being blurred out

Part of speciesist history in our society/ies is that critique of animal hatred, derogation, and so forth is muted. It can't be that we first have to be 'publicly visible' for our stances on animality to get noticed, accepted and be part of the debates. Most antispeciesist sentiment in its plurality is blurred out or reductively narrowed down ...

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Ethical exclusionists

Activists that mention all ethical environmental and social issues except animal rights and speciesism/animal objectification/... . Sounds familiar? Let's make these 'awkward exceptions' a cause for criticism.



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Animal Rights ABC: How can I assert my basic human rights to demand fundamental animal rights?

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This text in German <https://tierrechtsethik.de/einfach-tierrechte/> ; <https://d-nb.info/1270042017/34> ; <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:101:1-2022101200225868900363>

How can I assert my basic human rights to demand fundamental animal rights?

1. Putting animal rights on their own feet

All the arguments against animal rights put forward by opponents of animal rights are based on constructs of assumptions about animals, as we find them in our societies and their historical backgrounds, shaped by the various (primarily) scientific, philosophical, and religious traditions of thought.

> *What has led to a negation of animals, animal being, animalness?*

When arguing for animal rights, we can by no means leave unmentioned what has led, on the one hand, to the cultivation and nurturing of assumptions about animals in human history that have deprived and denied animals any basis for *recognizing and protecting their being*. That is, we need to look closely at the image that has been generated about animals as living beings in the world by humans, in the context of humans' own image (Selbstbild), to understand how the rejection of animal rights functions and operates argumentatively.

> *Humans have formulated their rights without including the fellow world in a constructive way.*

On the other hand, it is not enough to copy the approach in the self-granting of rights, because the path to universal human rights is itself marked by an obviously ongoing history of injustice and wrongdoing, and the formulation of our own

rights has been formed against a background characterized by a rather fundamental ignorance of the essential ethical connections of being human in the context of co-environment and environment.

Humans – against a background of severe hierarchical struggles of all forms and internal political tensions, conflicts and catastrophes – have built a foundation for an understanding of rights which, however, has deficits with regard to the questions that now arise in the Anthropocene.

Because we first had to escape from our own conflicts, so it seems, that thus we can at all – provided with our own rights – also stand up for own, original rights of nonhumans *and* the nonhuman space (for a right to protection from encroachments on the part of humans and of 'mankind' on animals), *we should also be able to admit to ourselves where our own legal situations, concerning our human rights, reach their own limits at the same time*, and that we still have to readjust a lot at this point. Especially in the matter of animal rights our human rights show various specific deficits, but more on that later.

Viewed against the background of our history, it is therefore not enough to see ourselves as a neutral blueprint for all questions of rights and the understanding of rights – rather, legal concepts with which we protect nonhumans from humans must fundamentally correspond to *their problematics and to the new questions that arise on the basis of their problematics*.

To present animal rights in an oversimplified form and put them as a big demand in the debate-room still mostly implies that the *underlying causes* of the problematics are addressed too little or not at all. The transfer of the topic “basic rights” becomes so often the first stumbling block.

Animal rights activists risk to deepen communicative rifts between antispeciesism on the one hand and speciesism and animal objectification on the other hand by a too simplistic approach.

An example

“For example, animals do not need a right to religious freedom, but they do need a right to life and liberty, including physical and mental integrity.” (1)

Here we have a typical benign lack of sensitivity to the issues of biologisms, which very much play a role in relation to speciesism in the very large issues alluded to. Bridges would instead rather have to be built from human-centric connotated bulwark topics like ‘religion’, to questions of fundamental ‘spirituality’ (*spirit, thinking*), and then again interdisciplinary thinking would be needed towards questions of what ‘spirit’ would imply and what would also in turn imply ‘spiritual integrity’. It remains unmentioned why we are still so far away from an *understanding* of physical as well as mental integrity in the animal question that we do not even line a demand for antispeciesistic legal formulations with the description of how exactly the extent and the *quality of the injustice* could be leveraged at all.

The demand stands naively in the room: If I do not name the injustice, it will be difficult for all of us to demand a clear definition of rights, as well as of limits of human “rights” in this case.

Everyday speciesism - a space without animal rights

The “everyday space” is composed as everyday speciesism, but this is not reflected much in the descriptions of injustice against animals. Even morally arguing vegans avoid expressing thoughts and feelings about injustice to greater detail, rather than opposing the other side with sole polemics (2). There is a difference between calling for compassion and denouncing injustice. Denouncing injustice is also possible in a space and context where legal rights for an affected group or subject are (so far) missing.

2. *Injustice to and towards animals (and their social and ecosocial contexts) and basic animal rights*

Can animal rights be formulated in derivation from human rights? (3) This is the general canon so far. This perspective on animal rights must go alongside the

assumption that our current worldview forms a sufficiently progressive basis, and that we should not take another step back to look again, and more critically, at the cornerstones of the identities (as ideas we form about the ‘essence of a living being’) “human” and “animal”. Some animal liberation approaches, meanwhile, suggest that the troublesome issue of “rights” should simply be left out altogether, as a human construct that need not necessarily be applied to animals (4).

What do we mean by animal rights that they have such a much more difficult status compared to rights ‘by humans for humans’?

There are different points of view on how people conceive of animal rights – on the sides of those who advocate for them as well as on the opposing sides.

- It is not the *particular rights* in their applicability that matter with *rights* primarily.

A typical question would be something like, “Yeah, animal rights, what is it? Do you mean something like, do animals have something like human rights?” Of course, it is alarmingly simplistic to say that what matters most about rights are *particular rights in their applicability* - that is, if I have rights, for example, in locomotion, in traffic, as a pedestrian, as a cyclist, or if I have my right to vote to elect parties to represent my interests, then these are in principle particular rights that derive from certain rights that are really fundamental.

- Particularist rights derive from fundamental rights

When we talk about *fundamental rights*, particularistic rights are not the most important thing at first. An example: people talk about species protection and about the term “species-appropriate” (“Artgerecht”). A term we find quite problematic in our group, because it does not encompass the ecological subtlety, the ecological fine-tuning of interaction between living beings, and is a strongly externally determining term. We do not go further into the problematic nature of this term at this point, but if we now talk about species protection, for example, we could say that this would be a *particularistic right, namely that certain animals have a certain right to certain habitats, or to a certain flora, to a certain ecological space, which must somehow be protected, recognized as their old or*

new habitat, and so on, and so forth. (What is clear is: that adjacent, of course, are fundamental rights issues, namely, that animals removed from their habitats over long or extended periods of time must have contextual and ecosocial rights to their *new/old habitats*).

- Species protection, from an animal rights perspective, implies – in addition to fundamental rights issues – the issues of particularistic rights in its handling.

The issue at stake in animal rights, however, is essentially fundamental rights. What are and what would these basic rights be, and from what do basic rights derive – so that they can really counteract the prevailing injustice?

- The question of *what basic rights are, and what they should/could be based on* (this in fact needs to be re-declined!).

Exactly at this point the opinions are divided in regard to animal rights – as we have already stated above – and I think the sense of the matter is also not that we think we all have to share the same opinion. In the end, we don't always share the same opinions on human rights either.

- Human rights are probably not implemented according to their ideals

This statement about human rights would be related to the analogy comparison, described above as inadequate – in which we assume that human rights would represent an ideal constellation and ‘realization-possibility’ of rights, like an automatism, which we could adopt in a suitable and advantageous form precisely as a blueprint for animal rights. (We cannot do this without not being able to do justice to the problems).

What could constitute the basic rights in relation to animals in the specific instead?

For this, we believe, one must first of all raise the question of freedom-rights (Freiheitsrechte) and the (recognition of the) autonomy-ability (Autonomiefähigkeit) independently of the comparison to humans. It is important that “man” is not the parameter (as an ideal or construct). This is a question of the conceptual choice of perspective.

Rights of freedom and autonomy are points in animal rights that are central to the question of fundamental rights, because they conceptually circumscribe the designated counterpart as a bearer of rights, taking into account the integrity of the designated subjects.

That is, *the first fundamental right presupposes* (thus contains a precondition) *that the opposite must be perceived in a special way and thus taken seriously*, etc. In turn, we as a society and as individuals should be able to critically ask ourselves *why we categorically deny freedom-rights to animals?*

- Freedom-rights and autonomy-ability

Why does the idea prevail that animals are somehow instinct-driven, guided by causalisms and that they would not have their own complex thought processes in their own ways, their own no less complex and possibly probably even more complex (and evolved) language and communication cultures, etc. etc.? Why do we derive everything from the human paradigm, in a hierarchical and negating way towards the diversity of animal subjects?

Why do we think that everything must initially be explicable in “our” (...) terms, when it comes to the question of rights of others – ‘others’, *through which our terms should actually experience a meaningful expansion?* Animals are, in fact, such others that should make us think.

- The non-humans and the non-human co-world and environment do not have to be explainable according to our terms in order to become recognizable in the sense of their rights

Now, of course, a rather banal objection could be: “No, they are not ‘others’, they are just animals”. But at this point, the question of attitude plays a fundamental role in the discussion about animal rights. For us it should be a premise to be considered that in all important ethical matters we are actually always dealing with questions of stances and “positional/perspectival location” (Haltungen) of people. Thus, I can take the stance that I presuppose a priori that animals are reasonable, in their very autonomous and own ways, that *I do not have a definitional sovereignty over them, but that they nevertheless have rights, which can be derived from their capacity for freedom and their capacity for autonomy (both terms implicitly and logically indicate that exactly this can indeed be denied to them)*, and I can see the dignity also founded in all this by conceding them all this in a recognizing way.

I believe that if we fundamentally deny other beings everything that constitutes their specialness, then logically we can also not grant these other beings fundamental dignity, as an expression of recognition and the ‘benevolent’ perception of their existence. So it is also a matter of stance and perspective.

Thus, in general, the idea that we take the right to grant or (in principle) deny rights to others is also merely grounded in questions of my stances by which I impose my ethical ideas on others for better or for worse.

- *There is the option of the affirmative attitude in the recognition of rights, and with it concomitantly of the dignity of others, without presupposing a human collectivistic definitional sovereignty to substantiate it.*

A very beautiful approach has been described by the philosopher Syl Ko. In collaboration with the philologist Lindgren Johnson, she spoke of the species-subjectivist approach, in an accompanying text to an exhibition by artist Mooni Perry, which is set against an ‘objectivist perspectivity’. (5)

Animal rights are something as essential as human rights. They affect all of us. We all stand in some relationship to animals. This can be positive and negative, more or less constructive or destructive, and it is definitely time to see animal rights not as a ‘special topic’, but they concern every human being.

Animal rights are ultimately about: how do I relate to the animals in my environment and to the animals in context of the political spaces shaped by humans in hegemonic ways as a whole, etc.?

3. One's own right in the context of the realization of animal rights

A problem of a special kind is that I, as a human being, do not have any effective rights that can be enacted in a direct way, to stand up for the nonhuman space *in an independent way from social animal-objectifying and "nature"-objectifying thinking* and the resulting ways of acting.

Among humans it is easier for humans to (typically) advocate for humans. This commitment is generally considered important in principle, although even here, from a sociological point of view, all kinds of obstacles act as inhibitors.

To stand up as a human being from the territory of being human as an *"unconditionally solidarical community"*, in a commitment for animals (in a new perspective) and the nonhuman space (- 'because of its self' and not as a resource for "our" future, etc.) is usually not taken seriously. That is:

I, as a human being, endowed by society with certain rights, have no possibility to insist on the rights *which I might recognize, in my perception of animals* (whom on the ground of our conceptualizations, no effective rights have been granted so far), *and to thus claim them in a human-hegemonic space, as long as no basic rights for animals (...) have been mandatorily formulated and even thought of in human societies* (at which point a particular questioning about the issue of the negation of 'being an animal' and the 'negation of rights' could find its place). With respect to 'nature': a self-interest of the genus 'human' is thought to be a more important pivotal point *than a right of animals to 'nature-as-their-home/space'* would be allowed to be considered as central.

Even in the communication about animals I encounter obstacles that interlocutors, readers, listeners, do not have to take my point of view seriously in an essential way, because one can refer to *prevailing agreements in the general attitude 'man > animal'*, and doubt the relevance of the deeper questioning, without being accused of 'speciesistic/animal objectifying ignorance', etc. There is simply no

sensitization in society (not even in the more audible majorities of minorities) – no matter how it could have been formed.

In principle, my human-rights-as-an-animal-rights-advocate ends at the border, where I, as a human being, stand up for animals, in the sense that I have no right to put a view of animals up for disposition that strongly deviates from the social majority. The image about animals that we discuss must not diverge all too much from the conceptions that prevail in society – although these conceptions lead and have led to the fact that we simply (degradingly) objectify animals. My attitude towards animals must be somewhere within the spectrum that is somewhat familiar to us in society, as any one of the known attitudes towards animals.

If I call for a *free constructive approach*, there is simply no ‘free constructive’ space for it, in civil society’s thought-vocabulary for categories of social relevance. Thus, our explicit thematization of an anti-biologicistic animal sociology as an approach can only be contributed on a philosophical level. A social efficacy is not possible so far, “thanks” to the fixed external-definitions (Fremddefinitionen) about the non-human space.

So finally, we can say that “my” human rights are relativized as an animal rights activist. With the lack of rights – suffered and experienced by animals – my rights as a human subject equally topple. The conditionality of animal rights in their interrelations with the rights of the natural environment is the further decisive chapter, which, however, is so difficult to describe in perspective, precisely for the reason that the subject of “animals” is treated from the ground up in an *insufficiently reductive manner*.

Not only animals themselves and the non-human ‘natural’ world itself are subordinated to arbitrary human decisions, but also the basis of discussion about them is narrowly handled in the common discourses

4. Possible levels of action

However, since animal rights are effectively withdrawn in the form – also via the (civic) social level (and hardly, only distortedly or equally not at all considered), I have the possibility first of all *through the sociological level, by language and*

action, to counteract the *cultural* mesh of the negation (which we observe and which we criticize). It should be noted that being aware of the resistances must become part of the case analysis.

Thus, apparently in the search precisely for how to circumnavigate the major social obstacles, philosopher Lori Gruen suggests that (but) instead of fighting out the legal situation with each other, we should rely on our moral compass. In this way, we would also be able to wisely avoid the hurdle of hierarchies (based on certain cognitive and sensory abilities and their proximity to humans) as we find them in the more popular animal rights approaches discussed to date:

Gruen states: “If we were to instead focus on what we owe each other and other animals, our relationships become a more central concern.”

And

“Focusing on how much other animals are like us forces us to assimilate them into our human-oriented framework; we grant them consideration in virtue of what we believe they share with us; rather than what makes their lives meaningful and valuable by their own lights.” (6)

However, Gruen almost seems to throw the baby out with the bathwater by considering rights in the non-human sphere as redundant *due to the potential for conflict*, which is illogical, since protection against human encroachment can only be realized on the legal level – just *as* with human rights, *which have developed differently in history*, encroachment by humans against animals and nature (...) can only be prevented by means of legal regulation and collective agreements.

The *negation* of ‘being-an-animal’ and ‘animality’ *and* the relegation of animal concerns to the ‘non-spaces of irrelevance’, *through the operational modes of terminologies of external-definition (Fremddefinition)* – which make exactly my right ineffective when I want to thematize contents and sue for rights *beyond the “human framework”* – are at the same time testimony to the fact that disenfranchisement *generates its effectiveness in society itself*.

And exactly at this point I can thus question society about the “why”, and should specifically draw boundaries to the approaches of “solidarity building” and “unanimity”, which rather tighten the net of misobservations and false conclusions about the human-animal relationship instead of dissolving it.

References

1. <https://animal-rights-switzerland.ch/themen-tierrechte/> (accessed 10/11/2022)
2. In social networks, it is repeatedly observed that vegans hardly couple moral accusations and demands with a discourse that raises questions about injustice and/or analyzes causes. Instead, a rhetoric dominates of demanded or demonstrated compassion/compassion-as-a-basis, altruism, sentientism (with biologicistic-reductive interpretation which does not address the negation of “thinking”, sociologized and deeper sentience diversity, ...), topics from the ‘environmental movement’ (that primarily divides animals into the categories of species conversation/diversity and “animal factories” (...). Animals become solely to be understood as a ‘species’ [all domestication and experimentation issues are a huge elephant in the room here!], without facticity of own history and without own stories, language, thinking, etc.).
3. This includes arguments such as that of the comparability with humans, the divergence from ableist contractualism, analogical comparisons to human rights violations, such as in <https://www.tierimrecht.org/de/ueber-uns/publikationen/argumentarium/tierrechte/> (accessed: 11.10.2022)
4. Philosopher F. Schmitz states, “What an introduction of basic rights for animals would mean in practical terms and to what extent it could really protect animals effectively is unclear” in her text: Tierschutz, Tierrechte oder Tierbefreiung? (Animal Protection, Animal Rights or Animal Liberation?), page 95, available online at https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/opus4-ubp/frontdoor/deliver/index/docId/9491/file/mrm2015_02_S87-96.pdf (accessed: 11.10.2022). To this rhetoric we wondrously ask: one would not

ask this question in matters of (universal) human rights, why do we do so in the case of animals/animality (Tierheit)?!?

5. I have translated Syl's excellent text which she wrote in collaboration with Lindgren Johnson into German. The text is also published on our site in English. Both texts are also available in the catalog of the German National Library. German version: <https://d-nb.info/1234807912/34> ; English original version: <https://d-nb.info/1234872005/34>
6. https://simorgh.de/gruen/lori_gruen_sollten_tiere_rechte_haben.pdf, we have yet to archive the translation, the original English text is at <https://www.thedodo.com/should-animals-have-rights-396292655.html> (accessed: 11.10.2022)

Note: We cannot on the one hand taboo ethically analogy comparisons and on the other hand propose a formulation of (animal) rights that works through the vehicle of comparability without not stumbling over our hierarchy-thinking in either case, etc.

Note: the human-animal relationship is triangular in the least: as a human-human-animal relationship or also human-*humans*-animal relationship, furthermore also as a human-‘questionworthy-relation-to-the-non-human-world’-human-animal...-relationship. There is no neutral “human-animal-relationship” in the given situation.

In context

Tierobjektifizierung / Speziesismus und seine Spezifika,
https://farangis.de/reader/e-reader_gruppe_messel_2022_6.pdf

Tierrechte: zentrale Begriffe und Begriffserweiterungen,
https://farangis.de/reader/e-reader_gruppe_messel_2021_2.pdf

Focus: human rights in relation to animal rights:

Fokus Menschenrechte im Verhältnis zu Tierrechten: Tierrechte und antibiologistische Tiersoziologie: Der Tierrechtsdiskurs kann nicht weniger

komplex geführt werden, als Diskurse über Menschenrechte,
<https://simorgh.de/about/tierrechte-und-tierrechte/>

Gruppe Messel Reader <https://simorgh.de/about/gruppe-messel-reader/>

Die Identitäten „Mensch“ und „Tier“ > <https://www.simorgh.de/objects/what-is-an-animal/> > dieser Text auf Deutsch: Mensch-Maschine? Tierversunft!, S.7 >
https://farangis.de/reader/e-reader_gruppe_messel_2021_7.pdf

Zum Thema Verschiedenartigkeit von Tierlichkeit >
https://farangis.de/tas/tschoerdy_azadeh_und_saline_2022_3.pdf, S.3



[Edition Farangis: Animal Autonomy E-Reader 2022 / 3 ... 27](#)

[Contextualizing Fragments: The Speciesism/Antispe angle and Animal Objectification](#)



“Utilising” and loving

It's nothing exceptional that petting and slaughtering go hand in hand on small farms in 'pastoral' contexts (1), and for many in society in reality the two don't necessarily form a contradiction that could be considered as 'deeply grounded'.

- Who takes offence at the cutishly belittling imagery of animals whom end up on plates?
- Who takes offence at foal meat or horse butchery for example?
- Who takes offence at the fact that:
 - killing wild animal species (which many people would indeed find potentially neat “to pet”) is the same as
 - killing animal species that have been torn from their freedom by humans at some point?

Both animals in either situations are not served justice. Society, in its care about technocratic “sustainability”, tends to see “farm animals” only as ‘physical-

problems-in-themselves’ and have no interest in saving them or fighting for justice on behalf of these individual subjects, etc. While wild animals are just the other side of the coin, though they seem to be protected, both are equally stuck in the same malevolent setting.

- Who takes offence at religious or spiritual-ritual rhetorics that may equate “respect for the creation” with “creation’s servitude to humans” – to the point of sacrificing animals to comfort their own human worldviews?

How do we conceptualize the things that are going on with animals?

The “carnism”-concept unloads the focus on a dichotomy of “indifference” versus “love of animals” that does not really exist.

The *functionalization of animals* to fit human desires and imaginations, is part of one and the same problem.

Animals are hurt, they are being humiliated, and belittled. And that affects all of them basically in some way.

The physical and the mental kind of terror (that brings along its physical consequences too) against animals – which overlaps within the whole setting of human- and animal geographies – cannot be traced back onto two separate and supposedly completely opposing stances in humans

- without simultaneously leaving the “stroked/caressed/beloved” animals exposed to silent violence.
- and not take into account the psychology of the *ritualization* embodied or contained within the institutionalization of animal murder, which can never be merely a mechanistic, completely emotionally decoupled act. Mass murder and any decided murder of animals cannot plausibly be explained as ethical casualness. The act of animal murder is culturally anthropologically being actively “justified, defended and legitimized” in terms of animal objectification.

The stroking of animals is a farce and has little to do with respect for the animal counterpart, because the stroked animality is usually being decontextualized in terms of animal sociology, eco-sociality and overall sociology.

Addendum: the conflation of “gentleness” and “violence” is also known to us from areas of sexualized violence. To our knowledge, it is not yet really clear how and why these “socio-behavioral progressions” occur in a strikingly regular manner. In the case of animal objectification, however, the interplay of human attention/affection-towards-animals and the human-negation-of-animals is also part of a recognizable behavioral repertoire of people when they are in contact with animals; and physical assault takes place here too.

Addendum 2: So we assume that this contradiction (affirmation of negation to the ultimates) is not a real ethical paradox for humans. Also not, from our point of view, since “petting/caressing” does not really have to mean much that is positive, as is observable.

- (1) see def. of pastoral speciesism, E-Reader: Gruppe Messel, Jahrgang 4, Nr. 6, 2022.

Animal Objectification and Negation

People who deny

that all the known forms in which Nonhumans are routinely objectified, are in fact the most severe ways in which you can negate someone, do look themselves through a heavily animal objectifying lense.

To turn someone into actual materials/'material resources'/material objects and total objects of external definition is a specific of oppressive animal objectification.

Your act of negating Nonhumans as 'being someone', is part of your narrow, homogenic thinking and part of the very same objectifying questionworthy standpoint.

--

Opposing all Forms of Animal Objectification

Why we step back from the Speciesism/Antispeciesism paradigm and focus on levels of Animal Objectification instead, which we think reaches deeper in the perspectival-based ethical problem that we are dealing with in the Animal Rights / Human Rights interfaces:

On which levels and layers do these angles operate:

Speciesism / Antispeciesism – operates on what at some point in history became the focal point of biological markers (the level of, for instance, morphology and phylogenetics, taxonomy). We have to look at how we understand the term “species” to operate this lense in Animal Rights sensibly.

From the angle deriving from “species” we can see how human society shaped and applied this very notion – legally, politically, culturally, etc.

Opposing Animal Objectification – assumes “animality” as a consciously “external” and lesser integrity-breaching, descriptive (aiming to be non-definitory) term, which creates more openness to an emancipatory language.

The angle of an opposition to “Animal Objectification” declinates cultural institutionalized and ritualized forms in which “animals” are being objectified on the descriptive and definitory level. It tries to be less presupposing in a burdensome manner.

Sentientism and Animal Sociology

What kind of disconnected sentience do we concede to nonhuman animals that (still) overlooks a full, a total spectrum of social and ecosocial reciprocity?

The social scale that we tolerate in nonhuman animals
is that of Darwin,

that of an inherent determinism

– as territorial patches within the manmade nowhere land, that lays outside of human-hegemonic definitional claims.

--

Being and sensing

Being or sensing/feeling ... ? Veganism vs. Sentientist struggles:

If someone argues forth or back for what argumentation is more substantial: that one of “life” (to be more meaningful as a criterion for human ethical concern) itself or that of “sentience”.

These angles are particularistic, foremostly if they move along the typical standardized philosophical borders.

Neither “life” nor “sentience” can be measured from a strictly human angle.

Animal Rights includes the ability to emancipate from objectivist humancentric viewpoints and enters into a philosophical space that allows freedom of the undefined: A basic respectful approach must not seek to overdefine its social and ecosocial environments.

Be it their lives or their sentience.

--

Faunacides are taking place

Faunacides are taking place, and the world seems to be quite passively watching, kind of summarizing this in terms of 'climate change' ...

And this one faunacide is the one in terms of 'species' and 'wildlife' ...

And the other concerns the Nonhumans relegated into forced birth/killing circles ... (lab, farms)

Another level of the ongoing faunacides is formed by the tragic intersections of both

--

Ecocide – Faunacide – Genocide, ongoing (1)

Climate change consists of a compound of consequences of different ways in which the environment is being damaged and destroyed.

All those single aspects of destruction are problems in themselves.

Environmental destructivity overall needs to be focused and addressed in regards to damages on all scales – that includes the microscales.

Simultaneously the human dimensions of how mindsets function, that enable and drive environmental harms in the name of “necessity” and “economic growth” need to be a point of societal criticism.

--

Ecocide is foremostly an ethical issue

The moral and the ethical aspects of environmental destruction need to be addressed for the sake of “nature”/nonhuman spaces/communities/life themselves.

The form of thinking that “nature” and nonhuman spaces exist for societal gains – in either direction constructive or destructive – poses a problem.

Our dependence on “nature” doesn’t legitimate our fundamentally hegemonial-anthropocentric attitudes towards “nature”.

The notion that nature and nonhuman spaces ought to serve human interests implies that we assume

a.) nature as a “resource”

and that b.) nature was void of autonomous meaning and ecosocial completeness.

Both notions are presumably the core ones that lead to destructive behaviour towards “nature”/nonhuman spaces.

Harming and polluting “nature” and nonhuman spaces are actions of anthropogenic ethical disregard for “nature” itself.

--

The term: sustainable

Sustainable ... sustainability in social terms, inevitable.

Sustainable ... when it means „growth“, seems a contradiction to economic-ecologic-justice.

Sustainable ... and beneath the term of “ ‘life’ on earth and water”, the rights and interests of ‘Farmed-Animals’ and ‘Lab-Animals’ (amongst other Animal Rights issues) are still being ruled out.

“Do you know all 17 Sustainable Development Goals?” >
<https://sdgs.un.org/goals> (15.10.2022)

The #EU uses too much language on sustainability that is incompatible with Animal Rights. The difficulties for animal advocacy and the injustice towards the (entire) Nonhuman Animal World have to become part of humanity's ethical home. We are positive the #UN can eventually help.

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Territorial schisms

“Segregation” in terms of Nonhumans and Humans implies segregated ethics, segregated subjectivity, segregated attributions, segregated environmental comprehension.

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Animal Sociology and advocacy

Where the notion of animality is mostly driven by biologism and general nonhuman animal objectification (philosophical, religious, legal, scientifically, and so forth) >

being “for animals”, being an “animal ally”, does not mean that these advocates share a similar view in their exact ideas of animal rights, ethics, animal lib, etc. > Like in human rights and environmentalism/environmental rights, you get exactly all possibilities of possible worldviews, hopefully trying untangle the damage done.

--

Dedication and commitment

Animal Rights includes both:

An affirmation of the respect we hold for Nonhumans (the bridge of “dignity”, as holding a respectful stance)

A fight for clearing messed up terms, that allow for systemic and other factual harms and devaluations of Nonhumans.

--

Abusive theories mirror problematic worldviews.

#languagediversity
on #epistemicbiologism

We are



Farangis G. Yegane



Anna Margarte „Anni“ Prenzel geb. Denk



Miriam Yegane Arani



The multicolored dog by Farangis



Badge made by Farangis for an exhibit



From a triptych from Farangis' Erinyes series



From the punk as a search for female autonomy series by Farangis



Azadeh Yegane Arani (cat family part of Yegane Arani's) and daughter of Saline Yegane Arani.




Saline and Mithras Yegane Arani (rabbit part of Yegane Arani family)




Palang and Bahman Yegane Arani (parakeet part of the Yegane Arani family)



Our former house in the Bundenweg 7, not existent anymore, has been torn down, we write about this in our autoethnographical journal.



Lothar Yegane Arani and Tschördy G.M. Yegane Arani, the editors



Woman and Fish in Sea by Farangis

Impressum

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Erscheinungsdatum: September 2024
Kontakt Daten: www.farangis.de
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